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ABSTRACT
Ecologists have frequently commented on the ability of Fretwell and Lucas’ (1970) ideal free
distribution (IFD) theory to approximate observed animal distributions, despite frequent
violations of the assumption that competitors are of equal competitive ability. In a previous
paper (Hugie and Grand, 1998), we provided an explanation for this phenomenon by recogniz-
ing that animals will often move between habitats for reasons other than simply to maximize
resource payoffs, given perfect information about current payoffs in all habitats. When such
‘non-IFD’ movements are incorporated into an unequal competitors IFD model, the equilibrium
distribution is predicted to resemble an IFD for equal competitors. Recently, this explanation
was criticized based on the results of an individual-based simulation model (Ruxton and
Humphries, 1999). Here, we show that this criticism is the result of assumptions that not only
differ fundamentally from those of our original model, but also are unlikely to be met in nature.
We also construct our own simulation model and apply it to both an infinitely large population
scenario, as assumed by our original analytical model, and a finite population scenario in the
form of an individual-based model. In doing so, we confirm the validity of our original results
and extend our theory to finite populations.
Keywords: habitat selection, ideal free distribution, individual-based modelling, patch switching,
population size, unequal competitors.
INTRODUCTION
Ideal free distribution (IFD) theory was developed to predict the distribution of animals
across habitats differing in resource availability (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970; Fretwell, 1972).
If all members of the population are equal in their ability to capture and consume
resources, a single equilibrium distribution is predicted. This distribution is characterized by
‘input-matching’ of competitor numbers; that is, the ratio of the number of individuals
between any two habitats will equal the ratio of the resource availabilities in those habitats.
If, however, individuals within a population differ in competitive ability, a number of
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possible equilibria are predicted (Sutherland and Parker, 1985; Parker and Sutherland,
1986). All such distributions have the characteristic that the ratio of the sum of competitive
‘units’ between any two habitats equals the ratio of the resource availabilities in those
habitats (i.e. ‘input-matching’ of competitive units, where competitive ‘units’ measure the
relative ability of an individual to compete for resources). One of these distributions
resembles an IFD for equal competitors in that total competitor numbers, as well as com-
petitive units, ‘match’ the distribution of resources (Sutherland and Parker, 1985; Milinski
and Parker, 1991). This resemblance between the predictions of the equal and unequal
competitors IFD models has been used to reconcile the frequent observation that the dis-
tribution of experimental animals often approximates an equal competitors IFD despite
measurable differences between individuals in competitive ability (Milinski and Parker,
1991). However, given that the unequal competitors model predicts a number of possible
equilibria, it is unclear why this particular distribution would be observed more commonly
than any other. Explaining this phenomenon is important because it could provide a
justification for ignoring the complications introduced by competitive inequalities when
predicting animal distributions in nature.
Hugie and Grand (1998) provided a novel explanation by recognizing that animals do not
live in an ‘ideal’ world, moving between habitats simply to maximize resource payoffs given
perfect information about the current payoff in each habitat. Instead, they distinguished
between such ‘IFD’ movements and occasional movements between habitats that occur
for a variety of ‘non-IFD’ reasons, including avoiding agonistic encounters, fleeing from
predators and searching for mates. Although IFD movements will end once an ideal
free distribution is reached, non-IFD movements can continue indefinitely (see Hugie
and Grand, 1998). Hugie and Grand demonstrated that, when non-IFD movements are
incorporated into an IFD model for unequal competitors, a single, stable distribution of
competitors is predicted. Moreover, this equilibrium will often resemble the IFD for equal
competitors in that total competitor numbers will come close to matching the distribution
of resources.
Recently, Ruxton and Humphries (1999) questioned these conclusions. Ruxton and
Humphries base their criticisms on the results of an individual-based model and their
assertion that Hugie and Grand incorrectly interpreted the meaning of asymptotic stability
in their analytic model. According to Ruxton and Humphries, when unequal competitors
move for both IFD and non-IFD reasons, they will end up being distributed in any one of a
set of possible distributions, just as in the original unequal competitors model.
One obvious difference between the models presented by Hugie and Grand (1998) and
Ruxton and Humphries (1999) concerns the size of the competitor population. Hugie
and Grand assumed a population sufficiently large that the stochastic nature of individual
movements could be safely ignored. This assumption allowed them to solve their model
analytically. In contrast, Ruxton and Humphries simulated the movements of a small
number of competitors using an individual-based model. Ruxton and Humphries claim
that, apart from this difference, the assumptions of their model are identical to those of
Hugie and Grand. This raises the question of whether the difference in the results of these
two models is simply due to the difference in the population size they assume. Regardless,
theoretical investigations into the effects of population size are necessary to determine
whether the theory of Hugie and Grand can be generalized to finite (and small) popula-
tions. Here, we present a general model of competitor movements for IFD and non-IFD
reasons, which mirrors the assumptions of Hugie and Grand (1998), and apply this model
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to both large and finite population scenarios. In the latter case, we employ an individual-
based approach, allowing our results to be compared directly with those of Ruxton and
Humphries (1999).
As we shall show, the new model supports our earlier conclusions. Moreover, we shall
demonstrate that these conclusions also apply to finite populations of ecologically relevant
sizes. As stated previously (Hugie and Grand, 1998), when population size is large enough
that the stochastic nature of individual movements can be safely ignored, the resulting
competitor distribution will always converge on a single, stable distribution. When popula-
tion size is finite, however, the stochastic nature of non-IFD movements will cause the
distribution of competitors to vary over time: the smaller the population, the greater the
observed variation. However, except for extremely small populations, such as those typical
of aquarium studies, the competitor distribution will continue to resemble an equal com-
petitors IFD, despite the presence of temporal variation. More importantly, even in these
tiny populations, the average competitor distribution will resemble an equal competitors
IFD. We conclude that the theory presented by Hugie and Grand (1998) is quite general and
that non-IFD movements probably play an important role in determining the ecological
distribution of competitors. Our investigations also reveal that the results of Ruxton and
Humphries (1999) are due to unique assumptions that not only differ fundamentally from
those of Hugie and Grand (1998), but also are unlikely to be met in nature.
We begin with simple verbal descriptions of our earlier analytic model and the large-
and finite-population versions of the current numerical model. (The mathematical
details of the model are presented in the Appendix. In addition, an interactive com-
puter demonstration of the model is available* for the Microsoft Windows® operating
system.) We then present the results of our current investigation. Finally, we outline and
respond to Ruxton and Humphries’ criticisms of our earlier paper.
HUGIE AND GRAND (1998) REVISITED
Hugie and Grand (1998) modelled the distribution of two competitor types differing in
their ability to compete for resources (i.e. ‘good’ competitors and ‘poor’ competitors)
across two habitats differing in resource availability (a ‘good’ habitat and a ‘poor’ habitat).
Following Parker and Sutherland (1986), we assumed that resources were non-depleting
and that competitive abilities remained constant across habitats. We considered the dynamics
of competitor movement between habitats for both IFD and non-IFD reasons and deter-
mined characteristics of the equilibrium that was reached. Although the model was written
in general terms, for the purpose of this simplified explanation [and to allow for direct com-
parisons with both Ruxton and Humphries (1999) and the current model], we further assume
that the population is composed of equal numbers of the two competitor types distributed
across two habitats, that the good habitat has twice as many resources as the poor habitat,
and that good competitors have twice the competitive ability of poor competitors.
We began by describing the outcome when competitors move between habitats simply to
maximize their resource payoffs given perfect (i.e. ‘ideal’) information about the current
payoff in each habitat. Such IFD movements will result in the familiar unequal competitors
ideal free distribution (Sutherland and Parker, 1985), with the distribution of competitive
units matching the distribution of resources. As noted by Parker and Sutherland (1986),
* http://www.evolutionary-ecology.com/data/1465demo.exe; or else contact either author.
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there are many ways in which the two competitor types could be distributed across the
habitats that will result in an IFD of unequal competitors (see ‘Unequal IFD’ line in
Fig. 1). One of these combinations resembles an IFD of equal competitors, in that total
competitor numbers, as well as total competitive units, match the distribution of resources.
Interestingly, at this distribution (hereafter referred to as M; see Fig. 1), the distributions of
Fig. 1. A graphical representation of the predicted equilibrium distributions of two unequal com-
petitor types distributed across two habitats, as described by Hugie and Grand (1998). When
competitors move for IFD reasons alone, the predicted equilibrium distribution is not unique and can
occur anywhere along the unequal competitors line (– ·– ·–). When they move for non-IFD reasons
alone, a unique equilibrium distribution is predicted at point nIFD. When competitors move for IFD
and non-IFD reasons combined, a unique equilibrium distribution is also predicted. Under most
conditions, this ‘combined’ equilibrium distribution is predicted to occur in the shaded region below
point M, the intersection of the IFD line for unequal competitors (– ·– ·–) and the corresponding line
for equal competitors (———). Because this ‘magic zone’ is located close to M, the competitor
distribution will resemble both an equal and unequal competitors IFD. However, because the magic
zone is slightly below both IFD lines, the equilibrium will exhibit a slight under-matching of both
competitor numbers and competitive units.
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the two competitor types will be identical, with each matching the distribution of resources.
Regardless, once the population reaches any one of the possible ideal free distributions,
IFD movements cease, as no individual can increase its resource payoff by switching habitats.
We then described the equilibrium distribution expected when competitors move between
habitats solely for non-IFD reasons. For simplicity, assume that all competitors have the
same, constant probability of moving between habitats for non-IFD reasons. In this case,
the distribution of competitors will be at equilibrium (hereafter referred to as nIFD; see
Fig. 1) when there are an equal number of each competitor type in each habitat. Unlike the
IFD movement equilibrium described above, nIFD will be a dynamic equilibrium, with
non-IFD movements continuing even after the equilibrium is reached. At this equilibrium,
the distributions of both competitor numbers and competitive units will be under-matched
relative to the distribution of resources.
Finally, we described the equilibrium distribution expected when competitors move
between habitats for both IFD and non-IFD reasons. In doing so, we demonstrated that
there will no longer be a set of possible equilibrium distributions of each competitor
type, as predicted by the IFD for unequal competitors (Sutherland and Parker, 1985).
Instead, there will be a single, stable distribution of the two competitor types across the
habitats. Not surprisingly, the predicted distribution (hereafter referred to as C) is a
compromise between IFD movements, which equalize payoffs per competitive unit, and
non-IFD movements, which equalize numbers. In most cases, distribution C will be
characterized by under-matching of both competitor numbers and competitive units. When
the relative strength of non-IFD movements is weak (as we have previously argued it
will often be), the equilibrium distribution will closely resemble distribution M. Thus,
researchers who were unaware of competitive inequalities might conclude that the dis-
tribution they observed was consistent with the predictions of the original equal com-
petitors IFD, despite slight under-matching of total competitor numbers. Note that C, like
nIFD, will be a dynamic equilibrium, with competitors moving in both directions for non-
IFD reasons and from the poor habitat to the good habitat to increase their resource payoff.
MODEL
The primary goal of Hugie and Grand (1998) was to resolve a specific paradox in the IFD
literature. In an attempt to generalize the problem, we did not provide specific equations,
including those for describing the movements of competitors between habitats. For this
reason, we begin by briefly describing a model of competitor movements for IFD and/or
non-IFD reasons. We then apply this model to both large and finite population scenarios.
We refer the reader to the Appendix for details about the relevant equations.
We model the distribution of two competitor types differing in their ability to compete
for resources across two habitats differing in resource availability. Again, we assume that
good competitors have twice the competitive ability of poor competitors and that the good
habitat produces resources at twice the rate of the poor habitat. We assume that the
probability of an individual undergoing an IFD movement during a given time interval will
depend on the magnitude of the benefit of changing habitats (i.e. the ‘switching benefit’; see
equation A1). In general, the greater the relative increase in resource payoff associated with
changing habitats, the greater the likelihood that an individual will undergo an IFD move-
ment (see Fig. A1). As in Hugie and Grand (1998), we assume that competitor types will
respond similarly to differences in resource payoffs between habitats. We further assume
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that individuals will switch between habitats for non-IFD reasons with a constant, fixed
probability, even after an IFD is reached, and that an individual’s propensity to move for
non-IFD reasons is independent of habitat and competitor type.
We combine these two types of movements into a single movement probability that
represents the probability that an individual of a particular competitor type, in a particular
habitat, will switch between habitats during a given time period (see equation A4). We apply
this movement ‘rule’ to the large population scenario by modelling the expected proportion
of each competitor type in each habitat from one time period to the next (see Appendix). In
the case of the finite population scenario, we construct an individual-based model to track
the movements of a finite number of individuals moving between habitats according to this
‘rule’ (see Appendix).
RESULTS
We begin by considering the results of the large population scenario. In doing so, we present
the basic results of Hugie and Grand (1998) and also provide a test of their predictions for
the specific movement model under consideration.
Large populations
Hugie and Grand (1998) assumed a large competitor population. Population size has
important implications for the way in which the net movement of competitors between
habitats is modelled because of the assumption that competitor movements, in particular
non-IFD movements, are probabilistic events. For example, consider what will happen if
individual competitors randomly switch between habitats with probability 0.5. If there are
only 10 individuals in the population, the proportion of individuals changing habitats at
any one time will often deviate considerably from 0.5. This might suggest that simulating the
individual movements of every competitor in the population is the most appropriate way to
model the net movement of competitors between habitats. We adopt this approach in a sub-
sequent sub-section. However, the computational demands of this method increase rapidly
with population size and simulation results are generally less informative than analytical
solutions. Fortunately, variation due to the probabilistic nature of events at the individual
level frequently decreases rapidly with increased population size and thus can be safely
ignored in ‘large’ populations. This fact is often utilized by investigators to simplify complex
phenomena by substituting deterministic models for probabilistic models. For instance, in
the previous example, as population size increases, the proportion of competitors switching
between habitats is less likely to deviate considerably from a value of 0.5. Thus, if a
sufficiently ‘large’ population is assumed, the proportion of competitors switching between
habitats can be assumed to be exactly 0.5. This is the approach adopted by Hugie and
Grand (1998) and the large population version of the current model. In both cases, changes
in the competitor distribution over time are determined by calculating the expected change
in the proportion of each competitor type in each habitat given the current movement
probabilities, without considering individual competitor movements (see Appendix).
Although the probabilistic nature of competitor movements can be ignored completely only
in an infinite population, a reasonable approximation is achieved when the population is
finite but ‘large’. The extent to which the conclusions of Hugie and Grand (1998) are valid
for finite populations of various sizes is considered below.
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Large populations: IFD movements (unequal competitors IFD)
Hugie and Grand (1998) began by considering the outcome when competitors move
between habitats simply to maximize their resource payoffs given perfect (i.e. ‘ideal’) infor-
mation about the current payoff in each habitat. As illustrated in Fig. 2a, when competitors
move for IFD reasons alone, the competitor population follows a direct trajectory to the
unequal competitors line. At this point, the population is at an IFD and all further move-
ments cease, as no individual can increase its resource payoff by switching between habitats.
The particular ideal free distribution achieved depends on the initial competitor dis-
tribution, as illustrated in Fig. 2a. This result is disconcerting for two reasons. First,
it suggests that, to understand animal distributions in the wild, one must know from
which initial state these competitor populations were established however many hours,
days or even decades ago that occurred. Second, because the resulting distribution need
not resemble the equal competitors IFD, it suggests that one must always consider the
complexity of competitive inequalities to predict animal distributions. We return to this
point later.
Large populations: non-IFD movements (null model)
Hugie and Grand (1998) recognized that animals also move between habitats for non-IFD
reasons. In the current model, we assume that all individuals switch between habitats for
non-IFD reasons with the same fixed probability, regardless of habitat or competitive
ability. In this case, the situation in which competitors move for non-IFD reasons alone also
serves as a ‘null’ movement model because competitors move randomly between habitats.
As expected, if individuals move randomly between habitats, they will eventually distribute
themselves uniformly across those habitats. In the current case with only two habitats, each
habitat will contain half the individuals of each competitor type (Fig. 2c). This equilibrium
differs from the outcome when competitors move for IFD reasons alone (Fig. 2a) in two
important ways. First, it is a unique equilibrium that does not depend on the initial com-
petitor distribution. Second, it is a dynamic equilibrium; individuals will continue to move
back and forth between the habitats even though the overall competitor distribution
remains unchanged. This fact is not apparent from Fig. 2c. However, a close examination
of the model reveals an equal proportion of each competitor type moving in opposite
directions at any moment in time (see also figure 1 in Hugie and Grand, 1998).
Large populations: IFD and non-IFD movements (combined movement model)
The most important results of Hugie and Grand’s (1998) model arise from their recognition
that animals move between habitats for both IFD and non-IFD reasons. The results for
the large population version of the current model are illustrated in Fig. 2e and support the
conclusions of Hugie and Grand (1998): when animals move between habitats for both IFD
and non-IFD reasons, there is no longer a set of possible equilibrium distributions as
predicted by the unequal competitors model (Sutherland and Parker, 1985). Instead, there is
a single, stable equilibrium distribution that does not depend on the initial distribution
of competitors. Thus, competitor distributions can be explained completely using current
conditions, without the need for historical data. As further predicted by Hugie and Grand
(1998), when the two competitor types have the same propensity to switch between habitats
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Fig. 2. The dynamics of competitor movements in large and finite populations. Each panel shows
a population’s trajectory from its initial distribution (•; A or B) to its distribution at the end of a
simulation (). All other lines and symbols are the same as in Fig. 1. Results are shown for both
large (a, c, e) and finite (b, d, f) populations of competitors moving for IFD reasons alone (a, b),
non-IFD reasons alone (c, d) and IFD and non-IFD reasons combined (e, f). In the large population
scenario (a, c, e), the competitor population follows a smooth trajectory from its initial distribution
to an equilibrium distribution. This trajectory does not vary between different runs of the model
that start from the same initial distribution. In the finite population scenario (b, d, f), the population’s 
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for non-IFD reasons, the equilibrium distribution falls exactly on the 1: 1 line between point
nIFD and the unequal competitors line. Hugie and Grand argued (and the current model
assumes) that the propensity of competitors to move between habitats for non-IFD reasons
will be weak relative to their propensity to move for IFD reasons and, therefore, that the
equilibrium distribution will be close to point M. This means that the distribution of
competitors will resemble the equal competitors IFD in that total competitor numbers will
come close to matching the distribution of resources. Again, this is exactly what is observed
in the current simulation (Fig. 2e), supporting Hugie and Grand’s conclusion that animal
distributions can be predicted without necessarily having information about competitive
inequalities. Finally, as predicted by Hugie and Grand, the observed equilibrium dis-
tribution is located in the ‘magic zone’ slightly below point M (see Fig. 1), resulting in slight
under-matching of both competitive units and numbers, as is commonly observed. The
results of the current simulation model indicate that Hugie and Grand (1998) did not
misinterpret their results for the large population scenario they considered.
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium distribution in the combined movement model is a
compromise between IFD movements, which equalize payoffs per competitive unit, and
non-IFD movements, which equalize numbers. As discussed by Hugie and Grand (1998),
point C is a dynamic equilibrium. Individuals will continue to move back and forth between
habitats for non-IFD reasons. In addition, individuals will move continuously from the
over-matched habitat to the under-matched habitat for IFD reasons because they can
increase their resource payoff by doing so. Despite this, the net movement of competitors
between habitats will be zero. This aspect of the equilibrium distribution has important
consequences in finite populations.
Finite populations
Large population models remain an efficient way of modelling population processes. For
example, Hugie and Grand (1998) were able to present an analytical solution to their model,
including a stability analysis, and simulation of the large population version of the current
model requires only a few seconds on a personal computer. However, the applicability of
large (essentially infinite) population models to finite populations remains an important
question. This is particularly true for models of competitor movements because experi-
mental studies often use populations that are tiny by ecological standards. In this sub-
section, we explore the effect of population size on competitor distributions to determine
the extent to which the results of Hugie and Grand’s theory can be extended to finite
populations.
We examine the effects of finite population size on competitor distribution using an
individual-based modelling approach (see Appendix). This is the same approach employed
by Ruxton and Humphries (1999). Both models simulate the movement of every individual
trajectory is not smooth and varies between different runs of the model due to the probabilistic nature
of individual competitor movements. Moreover, when competitors move for non-IFD reasons alone
(d), or non-IFD and IFD reasons combined (f), the population never reaches an equilibrium distribu-
tion. Note: 96 competitors of each type were assumed for the finite model. Data for the large popula-
tion model is plotted for 10,000 consecutive time periods. Data for the finite model is plotted for (b)
2000 consecutive time periods, (d) every 100th time period for 2000 time periods and (f) every 100th
time period for 3000 time periods.
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in the competitor population during discrete time periods. However, competitors in our
model switch habitats according to the same IFD and non-IFD movement probabilities
used in the large population scenario. Thus, the large and finite population versions of the
current model are identical apart from the assumption of population size.
We begin by presenting the results for a finite population consisting of 96 individuals of
each competitor type when competitors move for IFD reasons alone (Fig. 2b), non-IFD
reasons alone (Fig. 2d), or IFD and non-IFD reasons combined (Fig. 2f). Regardless of the
specific movement model used, the results of the finite population scenario differ from
the large population scenario in two important ways. First, the competitor distribution
now changes discontinuously, as there are a limited number of ways 96 individuals can be
distributed. Second, and more importantly, the number of individuals moving between
habitats is no longer completely predictable due to the probabilistic nature of competitor
movements. In fact, re-running any of the simulations illustrated in Figs 2b, 2d or 2f
is unlikely to yield exactly the same results. We now consider the results specific to each
movement model.
Finite populations: IFD movements (unequal competitors IFD)
Figure 2b shows trajectories of a finite population of competitors moving for IFD reasons
alone. The results are shown for two simulations that differ only in the initial competitor
distribution. Apart from the differences already described, the overall outcome is largely
unaffected by finite population size. As in the large population scenario (Fig. 2a), the
population follows a trajectory (albeit now irregular) towards the unequal competitors line,
at which point all further movements cease as no individual can increase its resource payoff
by switching habitats. Also as before, there are many ways in which the two competitor types
can be distributed between the habitats that correspond to an IFD for unequal competitors.
One important difference is that the particular IFD achieved now not only depends on the
initial competitor distribution, but also the particular path the population follows to the
unequal competitors line.
Finite populations: non-IFD movements (null model)
The effect of finite population size is more significant when competitors move for non-IFD
reasons alone. Unlike the large population scenario (Fig. 2c), the competitor population
never reaches a stable distribution, but instead continues to change (Fig. 2d). This would
be the case even had the simulation illustrated in Fig. 2d been initialized with an equal
proportion of each competitor type in each habitat, the equilibrium in the large population
scenario. This result is due, in part, to the continuous nature of non-IFD movements.
At equilibrium in the large population scenario, individuals continue to move back and
forth between habitats at a rate that is equal in both directions, resulting in no net change
in the competitor distribution. However, in the finite population scenario, the probabilistic
nature of competitor movements causes the number of individuals moving in either
direction to vary. This results in variation in the net movement of competitors into a habitat
and prevents any distribution from persisting indefinitely. For this reason, when competitors
move for non-IFD reasons alone, the dynamic equilibrium in the large population scenario
is replaced by perpetual change in the finite population scenario.
Does this result mean that our previous conclusion regarding the outcome of the null
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movement model is incorrect? Should we now conclude that if competitors move randomly
between habitats they will not be distributed uniformly across those habitats? Such a con-
clusion would be misleading for two reasons. First, the predicted outcome in the large
population scenario is still a uniform competitor distribution. Second, it should be obvious
that, while the competitor distribution is predicted to vary over time in the finite population
scenario, this variation is not haphazard. As we demonstrate below, this variation is centred
on the equilibrium distribution predicted under the large population scenario. Thus, even in
the finite population scenario, on average competitors will remain distributed uniformly
across habitats.
Finite populations: IFD and non-IFD movements (combined movement model)
The effect of finite population size on the competitor distribution when individuals move
for both IFD and non-IFD reasons is similar to its effect when individuals move for non-
IFD reasons alone. The competitor population never achieves a stable distribution but
instead changes continuously (Fig. 2f). Again, the explanation for this result is due, in part,
to the continuous nature of non-IFD movements. In the large population model, this results
in a dynamic equilibrium in which individuals move back and forth continuously between
habitats for IFD and/or non-IFD reasons at a rate that is equal in both directions. In
the finite population scenario, however, the probabilistic nature of competitor movements
causes the flow of individuals moving in either direction to vary, preventing any competitor
distribution from persisting indefinitely.
Once again, this result of the finite population scenario does not affect the conclusions
generated by the large population scenario. Moreover, as when competitors move for non-
IFD reasons alone, variation in the competitor distribution appears to be centred on the
equilibrium distribution of the large population scenario. We investigate whether this is true
in the next sub-section.
Population size
Here, we ask how large a population must be before variation in the predicted competitor
distribution is small enough to be unimportant. Also, we consider how accurately the
equilibrium distribution in a large population model predicts the average distribution in a
finite population.
We address these questions using the results of multiple simulations of the combined
movement model under the finite population scenario. For comparison, we also conduct a
similar analysis of the null movement model. We consider two population sizes. To provide
results for a competitor population of the size representative of most laboratory studies, we
selected a population consisting of 36 individuals of each competitor type (72 individuals in
total). Such a population is small compared to competitor populations in the wild, which
are more likely to contain hundreds or thousands of individuals. Unfortunately, simulating
such large population sizes is not feasible using an individual-based approach. For this
reason, we selected a more modest size of 360 individuals of each competitor type (720
individuals in total) to examine the effect of increased population size. For each population
size/movement model combination, we programmed a computer to perform 10,000
simulations and summarize the results. Each simulation began with all individuals in
the competitor population being randomly assigned to one of the two habitats. After
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simulating 10,000 time periods, the computer recorded the distribution of competitors
before beginning the next simulation. The results are summarized in Fig. 3.
As expected, variation in the competitor distribution decreases with increased population
size, regardless of whether the null or combined movement model is used. Moreover,
the amount of variation is comparable between the two movement models for a given
population size. These observations support the view that the effect of finite population size
on the combined movement model does not differ fundamentally from its effect on the null
Fig. 3. The effect of population size on the probability of different competitor distributions being
observed in a finite population of individuals moving for non-IFD reasons alone (a, b) and IFD and
non-IFD reasons combined (c, d). Each panel shows the results of 10,000 simulations beginning with
competitors randomly distributed between the two habitats. Darker areas indicate competitor distri-
butions that were more frequently observed at the end of 10,000 time periods. Shading is scaled to
approximate a continuous distribution and is, therefore, comparable between panels. The average
competitor distribution after 10,000 time periods is also indicated (). Other lines and symbols are the
same as in Fig. 1. When population size is extremely small [36 individuals of each competitor type;
(a, c)], the competitor distribution can vary significantly. However, as the population approaches a
more ecologically relevant size [360 individuals of each competitor type; (b, c)], such variation rapidly
decreases.
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movement model. In both cases, conclusions based on a large population model are strictly
true only for an infinitely large population, but become an increasingly good approximation
as actual population size increases. For example, using large population logic, one would
predict that, if competitors move randomly between habitats, they would distribute them-
selves evenly between those habitats. However, when the size of the competitor population
is extremely small, the competitor distribution will vary considerably over time and often
deviates significantly from a uniform distribution (Fig. 3a). Similarly, the distribution of
an extremely small population of competitors moving for both IFD and non-IFD reasons
will also vary considerably and will often lie outside the magic zone (cf. Figs 1 and 3c). In
both cases, however, as the competitor population increases to a more ecologically relevant
size, the competitor distribution will increasingly approximate the distribution predicted
by the large population model. For example, a competitor population containing only
360 individuals of each competitor type will rarely deviate far from a uniform distribution
in the null movement model (Fig. 3b) and will rarely deviate outside the magic zone in
the combined movement model (cf. Figs 1 and 3d). In natural populations containing
thousands of competitors, such variation should become even less relevant to the distribu-
tion of competitors across habitats.
Results from large population models can often be useful in understanding finite popula-
tions even when those populations are extremely small. Consider the prediction that when
competitors move randomly between habitats, they will be distributed uniformly between
those habitats. As already discussed, in small populations the competitor distribution will
vary considerably over time and will often deviate significantly from a uniform distribution
(Fig. 3a). However, competitors are still predicted to distribute themselves uniformly
across habitats, on average. For example, the average distribution of both competitor types
deviates less than 0.001 from a uniform distribution (i.e. 0.5) for the results illustrated in
Fig. 3a. In the case of the combined movement model, however, the correspondence
between the equilibrium distribution in the large population scenario and the average dis-
tribution in the finite population scenario is not quite exact. The average distribution of the
‘good’ (0.630) and ‘poor’ (0.656) competitors for the results illustrated in Fig. 3c deviates
slightly from the corresponding equilibrium values for the large population model (0.628 in
both cases). Moreover, the distributions of the two competitor types are no longer identical.
There are two technical reasons for these results.
The first reason can be understood by considering that the finite population model
behaves much like a large population model that experiences frequent random per-
turbations. In such a system, the trajectories around the equilibrium distribution become
important in determining the average competitor distribution over time. In the null model,
these trajectories are symmetric about the equilibrium and, therefore, the expected, average
distribution in the finite model equals the equilibrium distribution in the large population
model. However, because no such symmetry exists in the combined movement model, these
values deviate slightly from each other.
The second reason has to do with the asymmetrical effect population size has on
the switching tendencies of the two competitor types. In our model, we assume that the
probability a competitor will switch between habitats for IFD reasons depends on the
‘switching benefit’ – the relative increase in payoff the competitor would experience if it
switched habitats. More specifically, we make the simplifying assumption that, for a given
switching benefit, individuals of both competitor types will move for IFD reasons with the
same probability (see Appendix). In the large population model, this results in the two
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competitor types having the same propensity to move for IFD reasons, as previously
assumed by Hugie and Grand (1998). However, this is true only because solitary competitor
movements in a large population are assumed to have a negligible impact on the resource
payoffs in a habitat. When the competitor population is finite, the addition of an individual
competitor to a habitat can have a significant impact on the resource payoff in that habitat.
This impact is asymmetric because the payoff in a habitat is depressed more by the arrival
of a good competitor than that of a poor competitor. Thus good competitors will experi-
ence smaller switching benefits and will be less likely to move for IFD reasons than will poor
competitors. This asymmetry in the relative tendency of the two competitors to move for
IFD reasons causes the average distribution in the finite model to deviate slightly from the
1:1 line on which the equilibrium distribution in the large population model is located.
Regardless of its causes, the deviation between the equilibrium distribution in the large
population scenario and the average distribution in the finite scenario is small, even when
the competitor population in the finite scenario is small by ecological standards (Fig. 3c).
Moreover, this deviation decreases as population size in the finite scenario increases and
becomes almost imperceptible when the population reaches a size of 720 individuals
(Fig. 3d). With 720 individuals, the competitor distribution rarely deviates outside the
magic zone. These observations suggest that the assumptions and conclusions of Hugie and
Grand (1998) are appropriate for all but the smallest ecological populations. Moreover, even
in these populations, large population models likely provide a reasonable approximation
of the average behaviour of the competitor population.
A RESPONSE TO RUXTON AND HUMPHRIES (1999)
The results of the current model do not suggest any reason to believe that errors exist in
either the logic or conclusions of our original model (Hugie and Grand, 1998). Moreover,
our current analysis indicates that the consideration of finite population size only results in
variation around the predicted equilibrium distribution as is typical of many stochastic
models, including the null movement model. These conclusions are opposite to those drawn
by Ruxton and Humphries (1999) based, in part, on the results of their own model of
competitor movements in a finite population. To resolve these discrepancies, we examine
Ruxton and Humphries’ model and conclusions in some detail.
After obtaining copies of Ruxton and Humphries’ original computer code, we discovered
three programming errors that affect the results for their movement case (i) when Q (their
movement threshold) = 0.01, and all of the results for movement cases (ii) and (iii) [see
Ruxton and Humphries (1999) for further explanation of the three movement cases and
the parameter Q]. However, the basic results of Ruxton and Humphries remain the same
even when these errors are eliminated.
We illustrate the underlying behaviour of their model in Fig. 4a for movement case (i) and
Q = 0.01. After moving to the unequal competitors IFD line, their competitor population
moves back and forth along it, rarely departing by more than one individual from an IFD.
Departures are due to non-IFD movements and are immediately followed by IFD move-
ments that return the population to an ideal free distribution (although not necessarily the
same one). This behaviour is also revealed by the variation in the competitor distribution
illustrated in Fig. 4b. The darker squares along the length of the unequal competitors IFD
line are IFDs. The lighter squares adjacent to this line are transitory distributions resulting
from non-IFD movements.
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Fig. 4. The behaviour of the model presented by Ruxton and Humphries (1999) (movement rule (i),
Q = 0.01, 36 competitors of each type). Lines and symbols are the same as in Fig. 1. Panel (a) shows a
population’s trajectory from its initial distribution (•; A) to its distribution at the end of a single
simulation () lasting 20,000 time periods (10,000 ‘turns’). Panel (b) shows the results of 10,000
simulations beginning with competitors randomly distributed between the two habitats and lasting
20,000 time periods (10,000 ‘turns’). Darker areas indicate competitor distributions that were more
frequently observed at the end of the simulation. Shading is scaled to approximate a continuous
distribution and is, therefore, comparable to the panels in Fig. 3. As when a finite number of com-
petitors move for both IFD and non-IFD movements in the current model (Figs 2f, 3c, 3d), the
model presented by Ruxton and Humphries does not follow a smooth trajectory and never reaches
an equilibrium distribution. Unlike the current model, once Ruxton and Humphries’ model reaches
the unequal competitors IFD line, it rarely deviates more than one individual from an IFD. This
behaviour is central to the conclusions of Ruxton and Humphries.
The behaviour of Ruxton and Humphries’ model is very different from the behaviour
predicted by Hugie and Grand (1998). In particular, Ruxton and Humphries concluded that
Hugie and Grand were incorrect in asserting that the addition of non-IFD movements to an
unequal competitors IFD model will result in a single, stable equilibrium distribution.
Instead, they concluded that, as when competitors move for IFD reasons alone, competitors
moving for both IFD and non-IFD reasons will end up being distributed in any number
of possible ideal free distributions. However, the results of Ruxton and Humphries can be
explained by their underlying assumptions. These differ substantially from those of Hugie
and Grand and also are unlikely to be met in nature. We return to this point below.
Hugie and Grand (1998) include an analytical proof of their assertion that, when com-
petitors in a large population move between habitats for both IFD and non-IFD reasons,
the resulting distribution is unique and asymptotically stable. Ruxton and Humphries
(1999) state that this proof ‘does not demonstrate anything about the number of possible
equilibria; all it shows is that any possible equilibrium will be stable against infinitely small
perturbations’ (p. 638). They suggest that we merely identified the equilibrium properties of
the unequal competitors IFD line (Fig. 2a) and mistakenly attributed them to a unique
equilibrium distribution. However, an equilibrium point is asymptotically stable if, and only
Effects of finite population size on IFDs 145
if, the system returns to it after a small perturbation in any direction (Glendinning,
1994; Beltrami, 1998). This is not the case for the points along the unequal competitors
IFD line because the population will remain at equilibrium if a perturbation moves it
along the length of this line. Nothing will cause such a system to return to its original
equilibrium point because a change from one ideal free distribution to another is irrelevant
to the competitor population. In contrast, our proof of the asymptotic stability of point C,
the combined equilibrium, in our earlier model ensures that it is a single, stable distribution.
This conclusion is supported by the results of the large population model in the current
paper (Fig. 2e). Ruxton and Humphries offer no additional evidence that our original
model contains errors or is based on unrealistic assumptions about competitor movements.
Although Ruxton and Humphries (1999) offer no compelling reason to doubt the results
of Hugie and Grand (1998), their model does potentially provide an alternative way
of modelling competitor movements. However, we will now argue that the behaviour of
Ruxton and Humphries’ model results from unrealistic assumptions that effectively elimi-
nate the influence of non-IFD movements on the competitor distribution. The explanation
for why this is the case is best understood in the context of the equal competitors model.
Consider how a group of 36 equal competitors should distribute themselves between two
habitats, one with twice the resource availability of the other. If competitors only moved for
IFD reasons, one would expect 24 of them to occur in the good habitat. Similarly,
if competitors moved randomly between habitats for non-IFD reasons alone, one would
expect them to be evenly distributed, with 18 individuals occurring in each habitat. Now
consider what happens if competitors move for both IFD and non-IFD reasons. The
expected competitor distribution will depend on the relative propensities of competitors to
move for IFD and non-IFD reasons. In particular, the more likely competitors are to move
for non-IFD reasons, the more evenly one would expect them to be distributed between the
two habitats. This is exactly what occurs in our models of competitor movements (see Hugie
and Grand, 1998, and Fig. 5a). In contrast, the competitor distribution produced by
Ruxton and Humphries’ model never deviates more than one individual from an IFD
distribution, even when the propensity of competitors to move for non-IFD reasons is at its
maximum value (Fig. 5b). The same results would be obtained even if the population
contained millions of individuals. This example demonstrates the constant, overwhelming
influence of IFD movements in Ruxton and Humphries’ model.
One might argue that Ruxton and Humphries’ model merely presents an alternate view
of the relative importance of IFD and non-IFD movements; specifically, that IFD move-
ments will immediately correct any deviation from an ideal free distribution due to a single
non-IFD movement. To accept this viewpoint, however, one must accept the assumptions
on which it rests. We now compare the assumptions of our respective approaches. There are
fundamental differences between them.
Although IFD theory is concerned with the distribution of animals over space (Fretwell
and Lucas, 1970; Fretwell, 1972), evaluating the dynamics of competitor movements
necessarily requires consideration of time. Our models explicitly consider time: either con-
tinuously (in the case of Hugie and Grand, 1998) or in discrete time periods (in the current
model). In contrast, competitors in Ruxton and Humphries’ (1999) model move during
successive ‘turns’. Each turn actually consists of two discrete time periods: one in which a
non-IFD movement may occur, followed by another, in which an IFD movement may
occur. This alternating between non-IFD and IFD movements during successive time
periods assumes that animals are unable to make decisions simultaneously about non-IFD
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Fig. 5. The effect of the non-IFD movement probability (η or Q) on the distribution of a finite
number of equal competitors (36) distributed between two habitats as modelled (a) in the current
combined movement model and (b) by Ruxton and Humphries (1999) [movement rule (i)]. In both
cases, the non-IFD movement probability was initially zero and was increased twice during the simu-
lation. The solid black line indicates the actual competitor distribution during each time period. The
solid grey line shows the average competitor distribution during the indicated time periods and the
dashed line shows the expected competitor distribution if individuals moved for non-IFD reasons
alone (an equal number in both habitats). When non-IFD movements do not occur, competitors in
both models follow an ideal free distribution (24 of 36 competitors in the good habitat). When the
non-IFD movement probability (η or Q) is increased, random competitor movements between habi-
tats increase in both models. In the current model (a), this results in a competitor distribution that is
increasingly variable over time and more evenly distributed between the two habitats, on average. In
contrast, random movements in Ruxton and Humphries’ model never result in a competitor distribu-
tion that deviates more than one individual from an ideal free distribution, even when non-IFD
movements occur with the maximal probability (Q = 1). This result would be obtained even if the
population contained millions of individuals. Note that while η and Q are not strictly comparable,
both intend to model non-IFD movements as described in Hugie and Grand (1998).
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and IFD movements. It also assumes that animals alternate between considering non-
IFD and IFD movement decisions in strict synchrony across the entire population. In
comparison, individual competitors in our models simultaneously consider their non-IFD
and IFD options and are free to move between habitats for either reason at any time.
Ruxton and Humphries’ (1999) model restricts the number of competitors that can move
between habitats during a given time period to a single individual. This assumes that com-
petitor movements are not independent of one another. In the case of non-IFD movements,
the individual that moves is selected at random. In the case of IFD movements, the indi-
vidual that moves is the one that would benefit the most from switching habitats. All other
competitors refrain from moving during that time period, even if they would benefit from
doing so. In our models, individuals move independently of one another, as one would
expect if animals were concerned solely with their own fitness.
Finally, in Ruxton and Humphries’ model, exactly one IFD movement occurs during
every second time period regardless of whether changing habitats increases a competitor’s
resource payoff by 0.001% or by 1000%. In contrast, IFD movements in our current model
are probabilistic and occur at rates that increase with the benefit of changing habitats.
The assumptions of Ruxton and Humphries (1999) explain the results illustrated in
Fig. 5b. Deviations from an ideal free distribution are limited to a solitary individual
because only one individual is allowed to undergo a non-IFD movement during an eligible
time period. Moreover, because an IFD opportunity always follows in the next time period,
any such deviation is always immediately corrected. Figure 5b also demonstrates an
important difference between our coefficient η and Ruxton and Humphries’ coefficient Q.
Although both probabilities control the level of non-IFD movements in the population,
they are not equivalent. Our coefficient η is the probability that an individual competitor
will move between habitats for non-IFD reasons during any given time period. Ruxton and
Humphries’ Q is the probability that one, and only one, individual will undergo a non-IFD
movement during every second time period.
In constructing our models, we assumed that an individual competitor will make the
decision to move between habitats by simultaneously considering its foraging and non-
foraging options and choosing a course of action based on the consequences to its own
fitness. This assumption is reasonable given our understanding of how animals make
decisions (see Lima and Dill, 1990, for a review). To accept Ruxton and Humphries’ (1999)
argument, one must accept that competitors make movement decisions by alternatively
considering foraging and non-foraging decisions in strict synchrony across the entire
population. One must also accept that more than one competitor will never decide to
undergo a non-IFD movement at the same time, even in a population containing thousands
of individuals. Finally, one must accept that, following any non-IFD movement in a popula-
tion, all further non-IFD movements are inhibited until an opportunity for an IFD move-
ment occurs. We believe these assumptions to be unrealistic and hence question the
usefulness of Ruxton and Humphries’ model. At best, Ruxton and Humphries (1999)
demonstrate only that the conclusions of Hugie and Grand (1998) do not apply under the
former’s very specific and novel competitor dynamic.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of the current model do not suggest any reason to believe that errors exist
in either the logic or conclusions of Hugie and Grand (1998). In fact, when the large
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population assumption of Hugie and Grand is met in the current model, the results match
exactly their predictions. Moreover, our analysis indicates that finite population size only
results in variation around the predicted equilibrium distribution, as is typical of many
stochastic models. At ecologically relevant population sizes, this variation was found to
be small enough to justify the large population assumption of Hugie and Grand (1998).
Even in small populations, the large population model reasonably predicted the average
distribution of competitors in the population. For these reasons, we conclude that the
theory presented by Hugie and Grand is quite general and that non-IFD movements
likely play an important role in determining the ecological distribution of competitors.
In particular, non-IFD movements remain an important explanation for why animal distri-
butions often approximate an equal competitors IFD despite the existence of competitive
inequalities among individuals.
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APPENDIX: A GENERAL MODEL OF COMPETITOR MOVEMENTS BETWEEN HABITATS
In this appendix, subscripts refer to competitor types and superscripts to habitats. The symbol i → j
refers to a competitor movement from habitat i to habitat j.
IFD movements
An IFD movement is said to have occurred whenever a competitor that has perfect (i.e. ‘ideal’)
information about the current resource payoff in each habitat switches ‘freely’ (i.e. without interfer-
ence) from one habitat to another to improve its resource payoff. To model such movements, let si → jk
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be the ‘switching benefit’ – the relative increase in resource payoff a competitor of type k would receive
if it switched to habitat j from its current habitat i. We calculate si → jk  in relative terms so that its value
does not depend on the units used to measure resource payoffs. The details of these calculations
are presented below [see equations (A7) and (A9) for the switching benefit in the large and finite
population model, respectively].
Whenever si → jk  is positive, an individual of competitor type k should move from habitat i to habitat j
for IFD reasons. We assume that a competitor will switch habitats for IFD reasons during a given time
period with some probability that increases as the benefit of such a move increases. Let γi → jk  be the
probability that a competitor of type k will move from habitat i to habitat j for IFD reasons alone









0 if si → jk ≤ 0
(sk
i → j) αk
i → j
(si → jk )
α
i → j




if si → jk > 0 (A1)
where αk
i → j > 1 and β i → jk > 0. The value of γ
i → j
k  is a function of the switching benefit s
i → j
k , as
illustrated in Fig. A1. When the benefit of switching is small, the probability of a competitor moving
for IFD reasons is low. As the switching benefit increases, this probability also increases, slowly at first,
then more rapidly as the fitness benefits of acquiring more resources dramatically increase. Eventually,
the increase in the probability of a competitor undergoing an IFD movement begins to decelerate as
Fig. A1. Probability that an individual of type k will switch from its current habitat i to a habitat j for
IFD reasons alone (γi → jk ) as a function of the ‘switching benefit’ (s
i → j
k ) – the relative increase in
resource payoff the competitor would receive if it switched habitats. The shaded region is shown in more
detail in the inset graph. The dashed line indicates a value of 0.01, the value assumed for the probability
that an individual will switch habitats for non-IFD reasons (η).
Hugie and Grand150
additional resources yield smaller increases in fitness due to limitations in the amount of resource
a competitor can utilize. The exact shape of the function illustrated in Fig. A1 is determined by the
coefficients αi → jk  and β
i → j
k  in equation (A1). The coefficient β
i → j
k  is the value of s
i → j
k  for which γ
i → j
k  =
0.5, and αi → jk  determines how rapidly γ
i → j
k  increases at this point.
In most cases, there will be little reason to assume that a competitor’s propensity to move for IFD
reasons will vary across habitats. For this reason, equation (A1) can usually be simplified by replacing
β
i → j
k  and s
i → j
k  with the terms βk and αk, respectively. Furthermore, if one also assumes that the
propensity for IFD movements does not vary between competitor types (as in Hugie and Grand,
1998), equation (A1) can be simplified further by replacing βk and αk with the terms β and α, respec-
tively. To allow direct comparison between our current and previous models, we continue with these
assumptions. We choose the coefficient values α = 5 and β = 0.5. At these values, the probability of a
competitor switching habitats for IFD reasons alone increases sharply once the switching benefit
reaches 15%, but rapidly asymptotes once it exceeds 60% (see Fig. A1).
Non-IFD movements
We define a fixed probability ηi → jk  that a competitor of type k will move from habitat i to habitat j for
non-IFD reasons alone during a given time period. If a competitor’s propensity to move for non-IFD
reasons does not vary across habitats (see Hugie and Grand, 1998), the model can be simplified by
replacing ηi → jk  with the term ηk. Furthermore, if the propensity for non-IFD movements does not vary
between competitor types, the model can be simplified further by replacing ηk with the term η. We
make both of these simplifying assumptions in the current model. We assume a value of η = 0.01.
Thus, we assume that non-IFD movements are rare relative to IFD movements (compare η with si → jk
in Fig. A1).
Movement probabilities
Let i → jk  be the probability that a competitor of type k will move from habitat i to habitat j during a
given time period. The calculation of i → jk  will depend on whether competitors move
• for IFD reasons alone:

i → j
k  = γ
i → j
k (A2)
• for non-IFD reasons alone:

i → j
k  = η
i → j
k (A3)
• for IFD and non-IFD reasons combined:

i → j
k  = γ
i → j





Computer simulation requires that we model competitor movements during discrete time intervals.
Discrete intervals can cause instability in dynamical models because of the inherent time lags that they
introduce. This problem manifests itself in the current model when the probability that a competitor
will switch habitats during a given time period becomes too large. For example, a large proportion of
the population may move from one habitat to another for IFD reasons, only to find the payoff in the
new habitat sufficiently depressed to cause them all to return to their original habitat in the very next
time period. Such oscillations can continue indefinitely.
One solution is to model time more continuously by assuming smaller time intervals. We achieved
virtually the same effect by reducing the magnitude of the movement probabilities. (The smaller the
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time intervals, the less likely a competitor will switch habitats during a given interval.) We introduce a
scaling coefficient λ (where 0 ≤ λ < 1) to produce a new, scaled probability that a competitor of type k
will move from habitat i to habitat j during a given time period:
θ
i → j
k = (1 − λ) 
i → j
k (A5)
Damping of potential oscillation occurs when λ > 0. We used a value of λ = 0.9 in all runs of the
model.
Large population model
Applying the above movement model to a large population involves modelling the expected propor-
tion of each competitor type in each habitat from one time period to the next. Because we consider
only two habitats, the distribution of type k competitors in the current time period is completely
specified by p1k, the proportion of those competitors in habitat 1. The distribution of type k competitors
in the next time period will be:
p̃1k = p
1
k + (1 − p
1
k) θk
2 → 1 − p1kθk
1 → 2
(A6)
Iterating equation (A6) for both competitor types yields subsequent distributions.
Since the population is large, the addition of a single competitor to a habitat is assumed to have a
negligible effect on the resource payoffs in that habitat. Thus, the switching benefit is given by:
si → jk  =
r j − ri
ri
(A7)







where Ri is the available resources in habitat i, Kk is the competitive weight of type k competitors and
Nk is the total number of type k competitors in the population. In the large population scenario,
the switching benefit is the same for both competitor types, so the term si → jk  can be replaced with s
i → j
in all equations. Also note that while ri is calculated as a payoff per competitive weight, the same value
of si → jk  is obtained whether resource payoffs are calculated in this way or in absolute terms.
Finite population model
Applying the movement model to a finite population involves simulating the individual movements
of competitors between habitats. During each time period, each competitor switches habitat with
probability θ i → jk . In this scenario, the switching benefit, s
i → j
k , is given by:
si → jk  =
rk
i → j − ri
ri
(A9)
where ri is the current resource payoff in habitat i and ri → jk  is the resource payoff a competitor would
receive if it switched to habitat j. Here, the movement of one member of a finite population to a new
habitat is assumed to have a significant impact on the resource payoff in that habitat. Adding that one
















where nik is the number of competitors of type k currently in habitat i. As before, rk
i → j and ri are
calculated as payoffs per competitive weight, but the same value of sk
i → j is obtained whether resource
payoffs are calculated in this way or in absolute terms.
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